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This Essay analyzes various economic and moral issues that relate to the
actual/alleged unregulated conduct of public-goods producers, public utilities,
and "businesses affected with a public interest" (including businesses engaged
in common callings and common carriers) as well as to government regulation
of these categories of businesses. It begins by criticizing the conventional
definitions of "public goods" and "public utilities" and explaining why, on its
original definition, "businesses affected with a public interest" were not simply
"businesses whose decisions affected the public interest." It then explains why
the fact that one or more of the goods that an otherwise-Pareto-perfect (oPp)
economy could produce were "public goods" would result in economic
inefficiency. Next, it analyzes how the economic-efficiency problem posed by
public goods and the economically-efficient response to them are affected by the
reality that the relevant economy is not oPp. The Essay proceeds to explain why
"fair-rate-of-return public-utility-pricing regulation" renders it profitable for
regulatees to make otherwise-unprofitable decisions and delineates the variety
of such inherently-unprofitable choices that such regulation renders profitable.
It then discusses how these so-called Averch-Johnson-Wellisz (AJW) effects of
such pricing-regulation complicate the task ofpublic-utility regulation and raise
the possibility that government production of the goods produced by public
utilities may be more desirable than the public regulation of private production
of these goods. This Essay comments on the way in which the fact that the
relevant economies are not oPp affects the economic efficiency of the various
AJW effects and complicates the task of regulating public-utility pricing. After
that, it provides short accounts of the different types of moral analysis that are
relevant to the assessment of the moral character of the choices made by the
types of businesses traditionally perceived to require regulation and of various
regulatory responses that government could make to such businesses. It uses
these accounts to assess various moral criticisms that have been made of such
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businesses and the moral desirability of the government's regulating such
businesses in different ways. The Essay concludes by listing some of the most
important reasons why actual government business-regulations are less than
optimal and outlining various policies that might improve the quality of
government regulation of business.'
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The literature on "public utilities" and related commercial enterprises
denominated "businesses affected with a public interest," "common callings,"
and "common carriers" (hereinafter "businesses traditionally perceived to
require regulation") provides a great deal of illuminating historical information
and some useful economic and moral analyses. However, the existing literature
is also deficient in several respects. It contains (1) some definitions of the
individual enquoted categories of business that are not analytically useful and
differ from each other in ways that their proponents fail to recognize, (2) some
economic arguments that ignore or misanalyse some of the consequences of the
conduct of or various public regulations of these categories of business because
they implicitly incorporate unrealistic economic assumptions, and (3) some
moral analyses and conclusions that are inadequately morally-grounded or
conflate the moral and non-moral senses of salient terms. This Essay identifies
and tries to remedy these deficiencies.
The Essay contains five parts. Part I discusses the respective definitions of
"public goods," "public utilities," "businesses affected with a public interest,"
"common callings," and "common carriers." Part II focuses on "public goods."
It begins by reviewing the conventional analysis of the economic-efficiency
problems caused by "public goods." Next, it explains that this analysis is based
on an otherwise-Pareto-perfect (oPp) assumption that the only Pareto
imperfection the relevant economy contains is the buyer surplus that would be
generated by the supply of the public good if its supplier charged only a single
per-unit price for the good i.e., that the economy contains no imperfections in
seller competition, no imperfections in buyer competition, no (real) externalities,
no taxes on the margin of income, no exemplars of resource-allocator non-
sovereignty, and no exemplars of resource-allocator non-maximization. It
concludes by examining how the reality that all economies are highly-Pareto-
imperfect affects the analysis of the public-good problem.
Part III focuses on the Averch-Johnson-Wellisz (AJW)2 effect of traditional
"fair rate-of-return" public-utility-pricing regulation. It starts by explaining why
conventional "fair-rate-of-return public-utility-pricing regulation" renders
profitable otherwise-unprofitable regulatee-decisions. Next, it points out that the
diversity of these AJW effects implies that public-utility regulators would have
to control virtually all of the public utility's decisions to prevent "fair-rate-of-
return public-utility-pricing regulation" from generating such effects and any
undesirable consequences that would be associated with them and suggests that
the diversity of AJW effects raises the possibility that government production of
the goods that public utilities produce might be more desirable than the
2. See Harvey Averch & Leland H. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory
Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052 (1962); Stanislau Wellisz, Regulation of Natural Gas Pipeline
Companies: An Economic Analysis, 71 J. POL. ECON. 30 (1963).
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combination of private production of those goods and government regulation of
their private producers. Finally, it (1) demonstrates that the conventional implicit
assumption that all AJW effects are economically inefficient is based on an oPp
assumption and (2) briefly examines how the reality that all economies are
highly-Pareto-imperfect complicates the analysis of the economic-efficiency
consequences of AJW effects and the task of regulating public-utility pricing.
Part IV begins by stating my conclusions about a number of basic ethics
positions and issues (moral skepticism and emotivism, the distinction between
discourse about justice and discourse about the moral good, the different types
of Foundationalist arguments that have been made for the existence of a
universally-applicable concept of justice, the defining characteristics of various
moral types of societies, the philosophically-informed empirical protocol for
identifying the moral principle that a particular moral-rights-based society of
moral integrity is committed to instantiating in the service of its conception of
justice, the moral obligations and moral rights of the members of a liberal, moral
rights-based society of moral integrity). It then analyzes the appropriate way to
define "liberty" in a liberal, moral-rights-based society and the implications of
that definition for the correctness of liberty-oriented criticisms of various
government regulations of business in such a society. After that, it distinguishes
two senses of "discrimination" and analyzes the implications of the discussion
of "discrimination" for the claim that various types of "discrimination" in which
businesses engage violate moral rights. Its last section considers the moral
soundness of various other moral criticisms that have been directed at decisions
of public utilities and other similar types of business enterprises.
Finally, Part V responds to the obvious reality that, even if the unregulated
choices of businesses traditionally perceived to require regulation would be
economically inefficient and morally undesirable, public regulation might not
yield superior outcomes by briefly addressing the causes of sub-optimal
government regulatory-performance and proposing some policies that might
improve the quality of government business-regulations.
I. The Conventional Definition of Various Categories of Businesses
Traditionally Perceived to Require Regulation
Part I discusses and in some instances criticizes the way in which the
categories of commercial enterprises relevant to this discussion "businesses
traditionally perceived to require regulation" have been defined in the
literature. It begins with the concept of "a public good." Economists usually
equate "public goods" with goods whose marginal costs are zero or goods whose
supply cannot be limited to potential buyers who have paid for them (goods
whose consumers are in the above sense "non-excludable").3 However, the
3. See, e.g., Gabriel Rauterberg & Andrew Verstein, Index Theory: The Law, Promise




claims that economists make about the economic-efficiency problems posed by
public goods imply that a good should be defined to be a "public good" if and
only if two conditions are fulfilled: (1) its marginal cost curve (MC) is lower
than its average total cost curve (ATC) at the output at which the demand curve
for it (DD) cuts its marginal cost curve from above and (2) the average height of
the demand curve for the good in question between output zero and the output at
which its DD curve cuts its MC curve from above is higher than the height of its
ATC curve at that output. This definition of "a public good" is less restrictive
than either of the concept's two conventional definitions. Part II will explain the
economic-efficiency problem any "public good" so defined would pose at least
on the oPp assumption that conventional analyses of public goods implicitly
adopt.
Typically, those economists who focus separately on "public utilities"
equate them with natural monopolies-i.e., businesses that operate in situations
in which the quantity demand for their product at the price that equals the
minimum average total cost of producing it can be supplied most cheaply if the
product is produced by only one producer. In fact, it would be more useful to
define as public utilities any business operating in a situation in which significant
economies of scale would have to be sacrificed for the number of producers in
operation to be sufficiently large for price competition (and quality-or-variety-
increasing-investment [QV-investment] competition) to be perfect or (in some
difficult-to-define sense) "acceptably strong from a policy perspective."
First articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1877,6 the legal concept of
"a business affected with a public interest" has never been clearly defined. As
originally conceived, businesses affected with a public interest" were businesses
that, for some special reason, the State (the People) had an entitlement interest
in regulating. The concept was developed in a context in which government
4. See, e.g., Yair Listokin, Law and Macroeconomics: The Law and Economics of
Recessions, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 791, 846 (2017).
5. In my terminology, a quality-or-variety-increasing (QV) investment is an investment
that creates an additional and perhaps superior product variant, an additional and perhaps superior
distributive outlet, additional capacity, or additional inventory in a relevant (somewhat-) arbitrarily-
defined portion of product-space (ARDEPPS). (When demand fluctuates through time, additional
capacity or inventory will increase overall product-quality to the extent that it increases the average speed
with which the non-delivery-time-defined product[s] in question will be delivered throughout the
fluctuating-demand cycle.) In my terminology, "QV-investment competition" refers to the process
through which investors reduce the supernormal profit-rates that would otherwise be generated on the QV
investments in a given ARDEPPS by introducing additional QV investments into that ARDEPPS.
6. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
7. See id. Three types of interests or concerns can be distinguished. An individual has a
"psychological interest" in something if the individual has a desire and proclivity to pay attention to it.
An individual has a "material interest" in something (say, a particular act or social outcome) if that act or
social outcome affects the individual materially. And an individual has a legal or moral entitlement interest
in a decision or outcome if the individual has an interest in that decision or outcome that should be counted
when deciding whether the decision or outcome violates a moral or moral-rights-derived legal right of the
individual in question. To anticipate the text that follows, at least in the United States, the fact that
someone has a psychological or even a material interest in something does not give him or her a moral-
entitlement or legal-entitlement interest in it. Thus, the fact that I am psychologically interested in your
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regulation of business was thought not generally to be morally (or
constitutionally) permissible because it infringed the liberty interests of the
owners of the regulated businesses. Hence, when, in 1934, the Supreme Court
stated that "[t]he phrase 'affected with a public interest' can, in the nature of
things, mean no more than that an industry, for adequate reason is subject to
control for the public good," it was asserting a proposition that was not only
linguistically incorrect but inconsistent with the moral premises of the original
creators of the concept. I hasten to add that I agree with the 1934 Supreme
Court's conclusion that the State must surmount no special moral or
constitutional bar to regulate businesses or business conduct in the public interest
(because, for reasons that Part IV will explain, with one extremely-limited,
contestable exception, business-persons have no liberty right properly so-called
to make the decisions that such regulations would prohibit them from making).
I also am unaware of any formal definition of the concepts of "a public
calling," "a public service company," or "a common carrier." The list of types of
businesses that were placed into one of these categories (that were in essence
deemed to be "affected with a public interest" in the 1877 meaning of that phrase)
grew from a short, early-common-law list (innkeepers, etc.) to include an
astonishing array of business-types. 9 The determination of the types of
businesses that belong in this list seems to have been based on an unexplained
belief that the producers of particular goods and services had a moral obligation
to supply them in acceptable quality at a fair or just, non-discriminatory price to
all those who had the wherewithal and desire to buy them at that price (and to
complete the supply of any good or service that the supplier had begun to
supply). The preceding claim that these determinations were "unexplained"
reflects the fact that no one ever justified the following conclusions: (1) all
potential buyers have a moral right to buy or morally-ought to have the
opportunity to buy at the same, fair price acceptably-good exemplars of certain
goods and services but not of other goods or services; (2) the right to secure
particular goods or services is a right to buy acceptable exemplars of them on
non-discriminatory, fair terms rather than a right to be allocated them even if one
cannot pay a non-discriminatory, fair price for them; or (3) any such moral right
that does exist is a right against purveyors of the good or service in question
rather than a right that the government secures that good or service for the right-
holder.
II. The Conventional Analysis of the Economic-Efficiency Problem Posed by
sexual history does not in itself give me any moral-entitlement interest in obtaining information about that
history. Or the fact that I would obtain buyer surplus by purchasing some product from you if you
continued to produce and sell it does not give me a moral-entitlement interest in information about your
relevant production-plans.
8. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 536 (1934).
9. See BRUCE WYMAN, THE SPECIAL LAW GOVERNING PUBLIC SERVICE




Public Goods: Statement and Critique
A. The Conventional Analysis
The conventional economic analysis of the economic-efficiency problem
posed by public goods proceeds on three implicit assumptions. First, the demand
curve for the public good DDPG-Coincides with the marginal allocative value
curve for the public good MLVPG, which is the curve that indicates the net
dollar allocative benefits that would be generated by the consumption as opposed
to the allocative-costless destruction of successive units of the public good.'o
Second, the marginal cost curve for the public good (MCPG) coincides with the
marginal allocative cost curve for the public good MLCPG, which is the curve
that indicates the net allocative benefits that the resources devoted to producing
successive units of the public good would have generated had they been devoted
to the alternative uses to which they would otherwise have been devoted." Third
and relatedly, the average total cost curve for the public good (ATCPG) coincides
with the average total allocative cost curve for the public good ATLCPG.
Here is the conventional analysis of the economic-efficiency problem that
public goods pose:
First, if the prospective public-good producer is required to sell the public
good once it creates it at the single per-unit price that will result in the production
of the economically-efficient quantity of the public good (the price at which
MLVPG cuts MLCPG from above and [on otherwise-Pareto-perfect assumptions]
the price at which DDPG cuts MCPG from above), the public good will not be
created. The single per-unit price that the public-good producer must charge for
the economically-efficient quantity of the public good to be sold (the price at
which DDPG cuts MCPG from above where, on the analysis' oPp assumptions,
DDPG coincides with MLVPG and MCPG coincides with MLCPG) will be lower
than ATCPG at the output in question. The resulting economic inefficiency will
equal (the economically-efficient output of the public good) times (the difference
between the average height of DDPG=MLVPG between output zero and the
good's economically-efficient output and the height of ATCPG=ATLCPG at the
good's economically-efficient output).
Second, if the prospective public-good producer is allowed to price the
public good at the lowest single per-unit price it could charge for that good that
would result in the height of ATCPG at the associated output's equaling the price
in question, the public good will be created, but it will be produced in an
economically-inefficiently-low quantity. The fact that the price charged exceeds
the marginal cost of producing the last unit of the public good that will be sold
10. This assumption would be warranted if the economy were otherwise-Pareto-perfect
and reductions in the per-unit price of the public good would not alter the dollar-value to their consumers
of intra-marginal units of the public good by altering the real wealths of the consumers of those intra-
marginal units.
11. This assumption would be warranted if the economy were otherwise-Pareto-perfect.
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at that price implies that the height of DDPG=MLVPG will exceed the height of
MCPG=MLCPG between the resulting output and the output at which MLVPG cuts
MLCPG (DDPG cuts MCPG) from above. The resulting economic inefficiency will
equal the area between the DDPG=MLVPG and MCPG=MLCPG curves between
the highest output of the public good at which the height of DDPG equals the
height of ATCPG and the economically-efficient output of the public good (the
output at which DDPG=MLVPG cuts MCPG=MLCPG from above).
Third, if the prospective producer of the public good is informed that (1) it
will be required to sell the public good once it creates it at the sub-average-total-
cost price at which DDPG=MLVPG cuts MCPG=MLCPG from above but (2) the
government will provide a subsidy to the public-good producer equal to the loss
the producer would otherwise sustain by creating the public good and selling it
for a single per-unit price equal to the price at which DDPG=MLVPG cuts
MCPG=MLCPG from above' 2 or if the government creates the public good itself
and sells it for the above per-unit price, economic inefficiency will be generated
by the poll taxes or taxes on the margin of income that finance the subsidy to the
non-government public-good producer or to cover the loss the government
sustains by creating the public good and selling it on the stated terms. The
relevant economic inefficiency equals the allocative transaction costs generated
by the formulation, passage, and collection of the relevant taxes plus the
economic inefficiency that the associated taxes on the margin of income will
generate by rendering unprofitable economically-efficient decisions to supply
market labor rather than consume leisure, to supply market labor rather than
perform do-it-yourself labor, to save and invest rather than consume, perhaps to
buy one good rather than another (depending on whether the relevant tax is a tax
on earned income, a tax on unearned income, a tax on purchasing a good that
varies from good to good, etc.).
Fourth, if the prospective public-good producer is informed that (1) once
it creates the public good, it will have to sell the economically-efficient quantity
of the public good but (2) it will be allowed to cover the loss it would sustain if
the only price it charged for the public good were a per-unit price equal to the
price at which DDPG=MLVPG cuts MCPG=MLCPG from above by charging
higher per-unit prices for one or more intra-marginal units of the public good, by
charging buyers that want to purchase more than one unit of the public good at
the economically-efficient per-unit price a lump-sum fee for the right to do so,
or by using tie-ins or reciprocity agreements to sell the public good, economic
inefficiency will result for one or more of four reasons. First, all such pricing-
techniques would be more allocative-transaction-costly to devise and implement
than simple non-discriminatory per-unit pricing would be even if conventional
price discrimination and the charging of lump-sum fees did not create an
incentive for buyers to engage in arbitrage and the relevant tie-ins/reciprocity
12. A subsidy equal to (the economically-efficient output of the public good) times (the




agreements did not give one of the firms they involve an incentive to violate its
contractual agreement to purchase its full requirements of one of the goods they
involve from the other party to the agreement in question for a price that
agreement specifies. Second, price discrimination tends to cause economic
inefficiency by creating situations in which units of the good in question are
allocated to buyers that place a lower dollar-value on them (that equals or
exceeds the discriminatorily-low price they are charged for them) rather than to
buyers that place a higher dollar-value on them (that is lower than the
discriminatorily-high price these latter buyers would have to pay to purchase
them). Third, the charging of discriminatory per-unit prices or lump-sum fees
generates economic inefficiency by providing buyers with an incentive to engage
in arbitrage. Some explanation is necessary. Such pricing provides buyers with
an incentive to engage in arbitrage by reducing the price that some buyers would
have to pay to purchase one or more units of the public good below the per-unit
price or average-lump-sum-fee plus per-unit price that other buyers would have
to pay the public-good producer for the units of the public good they could
purchase from it. The creation of such arbitrage-incentives is allocative-costly
(1) because the public-good producer will generate allocative costs to deter such
arbitrage, (2) because efforts by the public-good producer to collect contract-
damages from buyers that violate their contractual obligation not to engage in
arbitrage will cause allocative costs to be generated by the public-good producer,
the arbitrage-practicing buyer, and the State, and (3) because arbitrage-sales
from an actual customer of the public-good producer to the buyer in the
arbitrage-transaction will be more-allocative-costly (less-allocatively-efficient)
than the public good producer's supplying the buyer in the arbitrage-transaction
directly. Fourth, any tie-ins or reciprocity agreements that are used to overcome
the public-good problem will generate economic inefficiency by providing the
buyer/(one of the reciprocal traders) they involve with an incentive to violate its
obligation to purchase its full requirements of one of the goods the contract
involves from the other contract-partner on specified terms. Once more, some
explanation is required. The relevant tie-ins/reciprocity agreements will provide
one of their participants with an incentive not to fulfill its obligation to purchase
its full requirements of one of the goods involved on specified terms because the
full-requirements-purchasing obligation would be unprofitable for the relevant
party if it were free-standing. This effect of the agreements in question is
misallocative because it makes it profitable for the party that would profit from
its contract-partner's fulfilling this contract obligation to generate allocative
transaction costs (1) to detect and deter such contract violations and (2) to collect
damages from contract partners that have failed to fulfill their full-requirements
obligations.
On oPp assumptions, then, the fact that one of the goods an economy could
produce is a "public good" will result in the generation of economic inefficiency,
regardless of the response the relevant government makes to the situation.
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B. The Critique of the Conventional Analysis
The conventional analysis of the economic-efficiency problem posed by
public goods is valid on its implicit oPp assumption. However, its relevance is
reduced by the inaccuracy of its (implicit) oPp assumption. This conclusion is
warranted because economies are not oPp. Further, unless the effects of the other
Pareto imperfections contained in a relevant economy perfectly counteract each
other (as they will do only rarely and fortuitously), the economy's other Pareto
imperfections will cause the relevant MLVPG to diverge from the associated
DDPG, the relevant MLCPG to diverge from the associated MCPG, and the relevant
ATLCPG curve (the average total allocative cost curve for the relevant public
good) to diverge from the associated ATCPG (the average total [private] cost
curve for that public good).
Whether the amount of economic inefficiency that an economy will
generate because (say) one of the goods it could create was a public good will be
greater or smaller than the amount predicted by the conventional oPp-
assumption-based analysis depends on several factors: whether the curve-
divergences just delineated (1) increase or decrease the economically-efficient
output of the public good (cause the output at which MLVPG cuts MLCPG from
above to be higher or lower than the output at which DDPG cuts MCPG from
above), (2) cause the differences between the average heights of MLVPG between
output zero and various relevant outputs and the heights of ATLCPG at those
outputs to be higher or lower respectively than the differences between the
average heights of DDPG between the output zero and various relevant outputs
and the heights of ATCPG at those outputs, (3) increase or decrease the economic
inefficiency that taxes that yield relevant amounts of revenue will generate by
inducing resource allocators to make economically-inefficient choices, and (4)
increase or decrease the ratio of the allocative to the private transaction costs that
will be generated by the devising and implementation of a relevant tax, by the
devising and implementation of pricing-techniques that involve price
discrimination and/or the charging of lump-sum fees (arbitrage-problems aside),
by arbitrage/(cheating on tie-in or reciprocity obligations), by efforts to prevent
arbitrage or cheating on tie-in-agreement or reciprocity-agreement obligations,
and/or by efforts to collect damages from buyers that violate their contractual
obligations not to engage in arbitrage, to buy tied goods, or to fulfill their
reciprocal-trading purchasing-obligations.
C. The Likely Significance of the Critique
I suspect that public goods are less problematic from the perspective of
economic efficiency than the conventional oPp-assumption-based analysis of




space here to establish all the relevant theoretical relationships' 3 and to delineate
and ground the empirical estimates/guesstimates that underlie this conclusion.
Nevertheless, I do think it worthwhile to explain six of the most important
relevant theoretical relationships. First, since the demand curve in the standard
public-good analysis indicates the quantity of the public good that will be sold
at varying before-tax prices and the marginal allocative value of a unit of any
product will equal the after-tax price its buyer paid for it (if the buyer is a
sovereign, maximizing non-monopsonist whose consumption of the relevant unit
generated no externalities and no buyer surplus), the height of MLVPG at any
output-quantity will exceed the height of DDPG at that quantity by the
sales/excise/value-added/consumption tax the buyer had to pay to purchase the
unit in question if no Pareto imperfection of any type previously referenced were
present. 14
Second, ceteris paribus, MLCPG for any public good will exceed MCPG for
that good by an amount equal to the external costs generated by the production
of relevant units of the public good."
Third, ceteris paribus, MCPG for any public good will exceed MLCPG for
that good by an amount equal to the external costs that the resources that would
be used to produce successive units of the public good would have generated in
the sacrificed uses from which they were withdrawn. This conclusion reflects
three "facts": (1) ceteris paribus, the private cost of any resource to the
resource's user equals (actually, infinitesimally exceeds) the private benefits that
the resource would have generated for its alternative user; (2) the allocative cost
a resource-user generates by withdrawing a resource from an alternative use
equals the net allocative benefits the resource would have generated in its
alternative employ; and (3) the fact that a resource would have generated external
costs in its sacrificed use implies that the private benefits it would have conferred
on its alternative user exceed the net allocative benefits it would have generated
in its alternative employ.' 6
Fourth, if the resources used to produce units of the public good (or to create
the public good) are withdrawn from alternative uses to increase the unit output
of an alternative good whose producer faced a downward-sloping demand curve
13. For detailed analyses of the relevant theoretical relationships, see RICHARD S.
MARKOVITS, TRUTH OR ECONOMICS: ON THE DEFINITION, PREDICTION, AND RELEVANCE OF ECONOMIC
EFFICIENCY 89-137 (2008).
14. For explanations of the relevance of the previously-referenced Pareto imperfections,
see id. at 129-30.
15. I should add that if "FC" stands for fixed costs, "AFC" for average fixed costs,
"FLC" stands for fixed allocative costs, and "AFLC" stands for average fixed allocative costs, FCPG and
AFCPG will be lower respectively than FLCPG and AFLCPG to the extent that the creation of the public
good generates external costs.
16. For the same reason, ceterisparibus, the FC and AFC of creating a public good will
be higher than respectively the FLC and AFLC of creating that good to the extent that the resources used
to create the public good are withdrawn from alternative uses in which they would have generated external
costs. I should add that, ceterisparibus, any difference between either MCPG and MLCPG or between FCPG
and FLCPG will also create a divergence between ATCPG and ATLCPG.
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and did not engage in price discrimination, did not engage in any form of lump-
sum pricing, and did not use a relevant type of tie-in or reciprocity agreement,
the imperfection in seller price-competition faced by the alternative user of the
resources employed to produce units of the public good once it was created
would cause MLCPG to exceed MCPG. The relevant imperfections in seller price-
competition would generate this effect by reducing the marginal revenues the
sale of the sacrificed units of output would have yielded below the prices for
which those units could have been sold i.e., by reducing the marginal revenue
products those resources would have yielded in their alternative uses (which
equals the sum of the marginal revenues that the sale of the sacrificed units of
output would have yielded their prospective producers and is infinitesimally
below their cost to the public-good producer) below the marginal allocative
products they would have generated in their alternative uses. This equals the sum
of the prices that the prospective buyers of the units of the alternative products
sacrificed to the production of units of the public good would have been willing
to pay for the sacrificed units in question, which constitutes the marginal
allocative cost of the units of the public good on oPp assumptions.'
Fifth, since the fact that an economy's other Pareto imperfections will
usually cause the private benefits that any resource-use would yield to diverge
from the net allocative benefits implies that these imperfections will usually
cause the private value to an employer of a marginal unit of labor (and hence the
gross wage that workers in the relevant category are paid) to diverge from the
marginal allocative product of that labor, the fact that actual economies are not
oPp will affect the economic-efficiency impact that any tax on the margin of
earned income will have by making it profitable for workers to substitute leisure
or do-it-yourself labor for market labor. To save space, I will focus on the effect
that other types of Pareto imperfections have on the impact of an economy's
taxes on the margin of earned income on the amount of market-labor/leisure
misallocation generated in it. Six subpoints are relevant.
First, the amount of market-labor/leisure misallocation that a given
potential worker generates will increase with the difference between the
allocative product of the marginal unit of market labor he performed and the net
wage he received for performing that marginal unit of market labor, where the
net wage in question will equal the marginal allocative cost of his supplying that
17. The text ignores the possibility that price-reductions may affect both the private
value of intra-marginal units to their consumers and concomitantly the allocative value of those intra-
marginal units by increasing relevant buyers' "wealths" (i.e., by making them better-off). For the same
reason, FCPG will be lower than FLCPG when the resources used to create the public good are withdrawn
from unit-output production by an imperfect competitor that faces a downward-sloping demand curve and
does not engage in price discrimination or use any other fancy pricing-technique. Similar arguments would
be applicable when the resources used to produce units of the public good once it was created or the
resources used to create the public good were/would be withdrawn from QV-investment-creating uses or
production-process-research-executing uses by actors whose resource-uses would generate externalities,
that would face imperfections in seller price-competition when selling the good/service their QV
investment created or using the production process their production-process research discovered, etc. For




unit of labor (the allocative value of the marginal unit of leisure he had to forego
to perform the marginal unit of labor) if he is a sovereign maximizer and his
consumption of the foregone unit of leisure would have generated no net external
benefits or costs.
Second, ceteris paribus, the amount of additional market-labor/leisure
misallocation that will be associated with any given increase in the absolute
value of the difference delineated in the first point of this list (if the sign of the
relevant difference does not change) will increase with the absolute value of the
original difference in question.
Third, if the worker's employer is a sovereign, maximizing non-
monopsonist of labor, the gross wage the employer will pay the worker for his
marginal unit of labor will equal the private value of that unit of labor to the
employer (for example, the marginal revenue product of the labor if the worker
performs unit-output-producing labor).
Fourth, in an oPp economy, the private value of a worker's marginal unit
of labor to his employer will equal the marginal allocative product of that labor
so that (1) the gross wage the worker obtains for supplying his marginal unit of
labor will equal that labor-unit's marginal allocative product and (2) any taxes
that are levied on the worker's marginal earned income will cause the net wage
he obtains from performing his marginal unit of labor" to fall below the gross
wage he was paid for supplying that labor (which on oPp assumptions equals the
allocative product of his marginal unit of labor) by an amount equal to the taxes
he had to pay on the income he earned by supplying his marginal unit of labor.
Fifth, in an economy that is not oPp, the other Pareto imperfections will
always or virtually always independently create a difference between the
allocative product of a worker's marginal unit of labor and the private value of
that marginal unit of labor to his employer. Concomitantly, they will create a
difference between the relevant marginal unit of labor's allocative product and
the gross wage that the worker was paid for supplying that unit of labor.
Sixth, in an economy that is not oPp, the other Pareto imperfections it
contains will affect the impact that taxes on the margin of earned income have
on the amount of market-labor/leisure misallocation any worker and all workers
generate in two ways: (1) by affecting the impact that the tax on the margin of
earned income has on the absolute difference between each worker's marginal
allocative product and his net wage and (2) by affecting the pre-tax differences
in question.
I derive the following three conclusions about the misallocative effects of
taxes on the margin of income from the preceding six sub-points: (1) if, as I
believe, the relevant Pareto imperfections other than taxes on the margin of
earned income reduce the gross wage paid unit-output-producing workers and
18. This will equal the marginal allocative cost of that unit of labor if the worker is a
sovereign maximizer and his consumption of the sacrificed unit of leisure would have generated no net
externalities.
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production-process-research-executing workers below the marginal allocative
products of their labor by reducing the private value of such labor to its
employers below the labor's allocative product, 9 these realities will cause any
taxes that are levied on the margin of the earned income of such workers to be
more misallocative than they would otherwise be by causing the allocative
products of such workers' marginal units of labor to exceed their gross wages;
(2) if, as I believe, the relevant non-tax Pareto imperfections increase the gross
wage paid workers who create QV investments above their marginal allocative
products by increasing the private value of such labor to their employers above
its allocative product,2 0 these realities will reduce the misallocation caused by
any taxes levied on the margin of such workers' earned income in most cases by
causing such taxes to reduce the absolute value of the difference between such
workers' marginal allocative products and their net wages (which pre-tax
equaled their gross wages) or by reducing the amount by which such taxes
increased this difference; and (3) the net effect of these complications on the
amount of market-labor/leisure and market-labor/do-it-yourself-labor
misallocation the government must generate to raise any given amount of
revenue by levying taxes will depend inter alia on the percentages of the taxed
workers that perform unit-output-increasing, production-process-research-
executing, and QV-investment-creating labor and on the differences that the
other Pareto imperfections create between the gross wages and the marginal
allocative products of workers performing (different subsets) of these categories
of labor.
Seventh and finally, the fact that actual economies are highly-Pareto-
imperfect also affects the amount of economic inefficiency that results from one
or more of an economy's potential products' being a public good by affecting
the relationship between the allocative and private transaction costs that would
be generated by given responses to the public-good problem. Economists have
never recognized the difference between private and allocative transaction costs.
However, in an economy in which Pareto imperfections cause the private
benefits that the resources "consumed" as transaction costs would have
generated for their alternative users to differ from the allocative benefits they
would have generated in their alternative uses, private and allocative transaction
costs are unlikely to be equal. The ratio between allocative and private
transaction costs will depend not only on the incidence and magnitudes of the
seven types of Pareto imperfections in the relevant economy2' but also on the
percentages of the resources used up as transaction costs that are withdrawn from
the various alternative categories of uses and the ways in which the economy's
19. See MARKOVITS, supra note 13, at 157-70, 172-204, for extensive but still-partial
explanations.
20. See id. at 212-31 for an extensive but still-partial explanation.
21. Viz., imperfections in seller competition, imperfections in buyer competition, (real)
externalities, taxes on the margin of income, resource-allocator non-sovereignty, resource-allocator non-




Pareto imperfections interact to create divergences between the relevant private
and allocative benefits those resources would have generated in each category of
their sacrificed uses.
Obviously, the facts that (1) economies in which one or more public goods
could be produced also contain many exemplars of all other types of Pareto
imperfections and (2) ceteris paribus, these other Pareto imperfections would
almost always cause the profitability of unit-output-producing, QV-investment-
creating, and production-process-research-executing resource-uses 22 to diverge
from their economic efficiency are relevant to this Issue's concerns. They imply
that it will be far more complicated for the government to respond economic-
efficiently to the reality that some of the goods its economy could produce are
public goods than would otherwise be the case. Indeed, as I will point out in Part
III, these facts are also relevant because they affect the economic-efficiency
consequences of the AJW effects of "fair-rate-of-return" regulation of the pricing
of public utilities.
III. The AJW Effects of "Fair-Rate-of-Return" Public-Utility-Pricing
Regulation
Historically, regulators have regulated not only entry into public-utility
"markets" but also a wide range of public-utility decisions. Thus, regulators have
required public utilities to provide goods and services of at least some minimum
stated quality and have prohibited public utilities from practicing particular types
of price discrimination. Regulators have also required public utilities to supply
all buyers willing to pay the prices the public utilities are charging and have
controlled certain aspects of the regulatee's accounting, contracting, financing,
and personnel policies. Finally, regulators have attempted to prevent public
utilities from incurring "imprudent expenses" either by prohibiting them from
making the relevant expenditures or by refusing to allow them to raise their
prices to cover such costs. However, possibly the most-important part of public-
utility regulation has always been the regulation of the height of the prices that
public utilities may charge.
The most common form of public-utility-pricing regulation is "fair-rate-of-
return public-utility-pricing regulation." Under this approach, the regulator (1)
estimates the replacement-cost of the investments that enable the public utility
to produce and sell its regulated goods-the public utility's "rate base," (2)
determines the rate-of-return that would be "fair" for the public utility to realize
on those assets (in practice, a rate-of-return that is somewhat higher than what
economists denominate the "normal rate-of-return" for the business in question),
and (3) calculates the prices the public utility is permitted to charge for its
22. The Pareto imperfections that all economies contain also cause the "profits" that
prospective workers would realize by supplying various types of market labor to diverge from the
economic efficiency of their supplying such labor.
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regulated products by determining the set of prices for those products that will
enable the public utility to realize the decided-upon "fair rate-of-return" on its
rate-base. The AJW effect of such regulation focuses on the tendency of such
price-regulation to render it profitable for the regulated public utility to make
otherwise-unprofitable rate-base-increasing decisions.
Here is the story. To the extent that "fair-rate-of-return public-utility-
pricing" regulation precludes the public utility from charging as high prices for
its regulated goods as it would otherwise find profitable to charge, such
regulation creates what might be called a "prevented-profit pool." In so doing,
such regulation renders it profitable for the public utility to make rate-base-
expanding investments that are inherently unprofitable. Such pricing-regulations
have this effect because-if any unprofitable investments the regulatee makes
are not excluded from the regulatee's rate-base on the ground that they were
"imprudent"-those investments will enable the regulatee to persuade the
regulators to allow it to make inherently-profitable price-increases on its original
set of regulated products. Such unprofitable investments put the regulatee in a
position to argue that such price-increases must be made if the regulatee is to
realize the allowed "fair rate-of-return" on its expanded rate-base. I hasten to add
that relevant regulatees will find it profitable to make the least-subnormally-
profitable investments they can make: any such regulatee will want to earn the
permitted, supernormal, "fair" rate-of-return on as much investment as it can and
will maximize the amount of investment on which it earns that rate-of-return by
making the least-subnormally-profitable investments it can make until the
prevented-profit pool is exhausted.
Although this account of the AJW effect is essentially the same as the
explanation for it that Averch & Johnson and Wellisz provided,23 neither they
nor anyone else (to my knowledge) has given a full account of the variety of
inherently-unprofitable investments or decisions that "fair-rate-of-return public-
utility-pricing regulation" renders profitable. The list includes decisions to make:
(1) inherently-unprofitable investments that may or may not be knowledge-
discovering that create superior or just different product or distributive variants
or additional capacity or inventory, (2) less-inherently-profitable QV
investments that create goods or services whose post-creation supply will be
more-capital-intensive rather than more-inherently-profitable QV investments
that create goods or services whose post-creation supply will be less-capital-
intensive, (3) less-inherently-profitable investments in known, more-expensive
but more-capital-intensive production processes rather than more-inherently-
profitable investments in known, less-expensive but less-capital-intensive
production processes, (4) investments in inherently-unprofitable production-
process-research (PPR) projects, (5) investments in less-inherently-profitable
PPR projects aimed at discovering more-capital-intensive production processes
rather than in more-inherently-profitable PPR projects aimed at discovering less-




capital-intensive production processes, (6) investments in productive assets
(machines, delivery trucks, production plants) that would have been cheaper to
rent, and, relatedly, (7) decisions to pay workers, managers, or trustees fixed
annual salaries (if such compensation-commitments are deemed to be
investments that are part of the company's rate-base) that are less-inherently-
profitable than decisions to pay hourly compensation with no guaranteed number
of hours of employment would have been.
Obviously, this diversity of AJW effects vastly complicates the task of
preventing them. I do not think that efforts of actual public-utility commissions
to prevent public utilities from making "imprudent expenditures" were
motivated by the regulators' understanding that the "fair-rate-of-return public-
utility-pricing regulations" they were implementing incentivized various kinds
of "imprudent expenditures." This conclusion is consistent with the fact that
regulators' product-quality concerns have focused exclusively on the possibility
that the quality of the products supplied by the public utilities they regulated
might be too low i.e., have not included concerns that the regulators' price-
regulations might induce the public utilities to offer an array of products that was
too diverse and of too-high quality from the perspective of economic efficiency.
The diversity of AJW effects also increases the likelihood that the most-
economically-efficient and morally-desirable government response to the
existence of economies of scale relative to the extent of the "market" that make
it allocatively costly to preserve the operation of enough competitors to achieve
a socially-desirable amount of price (and QV-investment) competition might
well be government production rather than a combination of private production
and government price-regulation. If the price-regulation that would have to be
effectuated to achieve relevant economic-efficiency and distributive-desirability
goals would have to be combined with close government-supervision of virtually
all of the regulated company's business-decisions to prevent the price-regulation
from inducing the regulatee to make a wide variety of inherently-unprofitable
and, more to the point, economically-inefficient and morally-undesirable
business-decisions, might not public production be more desirable? Admittedly,
as Part V of this Essay acknowledges, for a variety of reasons, one almost
certainly cannot rely on government officials to run such businesses economic-
efficiently or morally-desirably. Still, government decision-making would seem
to be equally problematic when the government acts as regulator as when it acts
as producer.
As indicated previously, I want to make another set of points about the AJW
effects of "fair-rate-of-return public-utility-pricing regulation." These points
relate to the implicit assumption of the AJW literature (which this Part has so far
accepted) that the inherently-unprofitable decisions elicited by "fair-rate-of-
return public-utility-pricing regulations" will reduce economic efficiency by the
same amount by which they would lower their perpetrators' profits if they would
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not give their perpetrators access to their prevented-profit pools.24 This
assumption is incorrect. Although these two amounts would equal each other in
an otherwise-Pareto-perfect economy, in our actual, highly-Pareto-imperfect
economy, they will do so only rarely and fortuitously. For the same reasons that,
as Part II showed, the profits yielded by the production of successive units of any
public good will equal the economic-efficiency gains that their
production/consumption generated only rarely and fortuitously in our actual,
highly-Pareto-imperfect economy, the direct profit-loss that AJW-effect-induced
decisions will equal the economic inefficiency those decisions generate in our
actual, highly-Pareto-imperfect economy only rarely and fortuitously.
I do not have the space here to analyze the relationship between the direct-
profit loss and economic-efficiency loss generated by the seven types of
inherently-unprofitable business decisions that "fair-rate-of-return public-utility-
pricing regulations" will induce regulatees to make. Still, I think it may be
informative for me to make seven related points.
First, because I think that the joint impact of an economy's other Pareto
imperfections (especially, the imperfections in seller price-competition
economies contain) would cause QV investments to be more profitable than
economically efficient,25 AJW effects aside, I suspect that the economic
inefficiency that will be generated by public-utility QV investments induced by
"fair-rate-of-return public-utility-pricing regulation" will exceed the direct-profit
losses those investments generate.
Second, I suspect that any decisions induced by "fair-rate-of-return public-
utility-pricing regulation" to create less-inherently-profitable QV investments
whose creation and use will be more-capital-intensive rather than more-
inherently-profitable QV investments whose creation and use would be less-
capital-intensive will be economically inefficient. However, I have no view on
the ratio of the resulting economic inefficiency to the associated direct-profit
loss.
Third, the conclusions expressed in Item (2) of this list also apply to any
decisions such pricing regulation induces regulatees to make to use inherently-
less-profitable, known, more-capital-intensive production processes rather than
inherently-more-profitable, known, less-capital-intensive production processes.
Fourth, because I think that the joint impact of the other Pareto
imperfections economies contain (especially, the imperfections in seller price-
competition they contain) would cause PPR projects to be less profitable than
economically efficient, AJW effects aside,26 I expect that any additional PPR
projects induced by "fair-rate-of-return public-utility-pricing regulations" will
reduce economic efficiency by less than the direct-profit loss they generate
24. See, e.g., Averch & Johnson, supra note 2; Wellisz, supra note 2; ALFRED E. KAHN,
THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS, VOL. 11 at 49-59 (1971).
25. See MARKOVITS, supra note 13, at 172-202.




(indeed, I suspect that such AJW-effect-induced PPR projects might well be
economically efficient across all cases).
Fifth, I suspect that any decisions induced by "fair-rate-of-return public-
utility-pricing regulation" to substitute less-inherently-profitable PPR projects
aiming to discover more-capital-intensive production processes for more-
inherently-profitable PPR projects aiming to discover less-capital-intensive
production processes will reduce economic efficiency as well as direct profits.
However, I have no idea about the ratio of the economic-efficiency loss to the
direct-profit loss.
Sixth, the conclusions expressed in Item (5) of this list will also apply to
any inherently-unprofitable decisions that such pricing-regulation induces
regulatees to make to buy rather than to lease productive assets.
Seventh, the conclusions expressed in Item (5) of this list will also apply to
any inherently-unprofitable decisions that such pricing-regulation induces
regulatees to make to pay workers, managers, and trustees guaranteed annual
salaries rather than hourly wages with no guaranteed hours of employment.
The general point I have just made about the impact that an economy's
other Pareto imperfections have on the economic-efficiency consequences of any
AJW effects of "fair-rate-of-return public-utility-pricing regulation" is salient in
the current context because it is relevant to (1) the economic efficiency/overall
moral desirability of "fair-rate-of-return public-utility-pricing regulation," (2)
the nature and allocative cost of the protocol that the public-utility commissions
that implement such pricing-regulations should use to determine whether
particular regulatee-expenditures should be excluded from its rate-base, and (3)
the relative desirability of the government's responding to economies of scale
that are troublingly large relative to the extent of the market by producing the
goods in question itself, licensing private companies to do so and regulating their
conduct, or allowing private companies to produce such goods without
regulating them.
IV. Some Relevant Moral Observations
Various claims have been made about the moral undesirability of some of
the choices that would be made by businesses affected with a public interest if
they were unregulated and of the moral desirability of various types of
government regulations of such commercial enterprises. Part IV comments on
some of these moral claims.
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A. My Conclusions About Various Moral Positions and Issues
(1) Basic Ethics Positions
Several of the moral analyses this Essay contains reflect my subscription to
one or more of the following seven basic ethics positions or sets of related ethics
positions:
First, I reject moral skepticism and emotivism i.e., I believe that moral
concepts and arguments are coherent and that moral conclusions are
substantively important. (They do more than articulate the kind of preferences
individuals have for such things as Baskin and Robbins' "Here Comes the
Fudge" chocolate ice-cream and convey more than the fact that the
communicator has strong feelings about the conclusion expressed.)
Second, I believe that the members of and governments of at least some
societies engage in a bifurcated prescriptive-moral discourse in which a strong
distinction is drawn between discourse about "the just"-i.e., about moral rights
and obligations-and discourse about "the moral good"-i.e., about what
morally-ought to be done from the perspective of some moral norm other than
the norm that grounds the relevant society's conception of justice.
Third, I do not rule out the possibility that some "Foundationalist"
argument can establish the "objective truth" and therefore universal applicability
of a particular concept of "the just" (or a particular concept of "the moral good").
Further, I recognize that foundationalist (with a lower-case "f"), Aristotelian,
Kantian, and Natural Rights philosophers have tried to derive such a concept of
justice respectively from the concept of the moral, the concept of human
flourishing, the concept of human freedom or what would be rational for a
creature that can plan, and the concept of human nature. However, I have not
been persuaded by any such argument. Although I believe that coherent,
important distinctions can be drawn among "the moral," "the immoral," and "the
non-moral," I do not believe that the "objective truth" of a particular concept of
"the just" or of "the moral good" has yet been established.
Fourth, I believe that individual societies can be placed into different moral
categories. They can be "moral-rights-based societies of moral integrity
(societies that draw a strong distinction between the just and the moral good and
are committed to maximizing the extent to which justice is obtained [moral-
rights-related interests are secured] even when a universally-subscribed-to
morally-defensible conception of the moral good must be substantially disserved
to achieve a tiny increase in the extent to which moral-rights-related interests are
secured), "immoral societies," or "amoral societies" (societies that base too
many decisions weighted by their moral importance on non-moral criteria or that
base enough moral decisions of sufficient importance on different morally-
defensible criteria that are applied selectively on an ad hoc basis).
Fifth, I believe that philosophically-informed empirical analyses of (1) the




members and governments of the United States and the other nations whose
relevant businesses' conduct and whose business-regulations are at issue as well
as (2) various facts that reduce the damage that other facts that do not fit the
following conclusion do to the argument for it imply that the countries in
question are liberal, moral-rights-based societies of moral integrity.27 The claim
that these societies are liberal, moral-rights-based societies is a claim that the
concept of justice they are committed to instantiating places a lexically-highest
value on all creatures' that possess the neurological prerequisites for taking their
lives morally seriously (by considering carefully and fulfilling their liberal moral
obligations, by devoting a requisite amount of attention to choosing their
personal conception of the moral good, and by making choices that conform at
each point in time to the morally-defensible conception of the moral good to
which they subscribe at that point in time) having an appropriate opportunity to
lead such a life; and the claim that the societies in question are liberal, moral-
rights-based societies of moral integrity is the claim that its members' and
governments' moral discourse, conclusions, perceptions, and conduct fit that
characterization sufficiently well (given the partially-exonerating explicability
of those facts that do not fit it) to warrant the society's being characterized as a
society of moral integrity.
Sixth, I believe that a liberal, moral-rights-based society's non-government
actors have a basic moral duty to treat each other with appropriate, equal respect
and to act in ways that manifest their appropriate concern for each other-in part
for each other's welfare in the hedonic sense in which nayve utilitarians and many
economists understand this concept but pre-eminently for their fellow society-
members'/participants' having an appropriate opportunity to take their lives
morally seriously. This basic moral duty encompasses a wide range of more
specific moral duties: inter alia (1) not to discriminate against others (in most
contexts), (2) not to slander or libel others, (3) not to deceive others in non-
contractual contexts, (4) not to treat others disrespectfully in contractual contexts
by deceiving them, (5) when acting as a party to a contract, to make the response
to unforeseen contingencies that affect the dollar-value of contract-performance
to the contract-partners that maximizes the joint dollar-interest of the contract-
partners 28 and to compensate a contract-partner that has fulfilled the above
obligation so as to restore the anticipated division of the expected joint dollar-
gain between the contract-partners, (6) not to steal or improperly convert the
property of others, (7) not to assault others when there is no moral justification
for doing so, (8) to make appropriate moves to reduce the accident and pollution
losses one imposes on others-roughly speaking, (A) when the loss that the actor
27. For detailed accounts of the "fit" and "explicability of non-fits" protocols for
identifying the moral principle that a particular moral-rights-based society of moral integrity is committed
to instantiating in the service of its conception of justice, see RICHARD S. MARKOVITS, MATTERS OF
PRINCIPLE: LEGITIMATE LEGAL ARGUMENT AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 23-34 (1998).
28. For the liberal (in the relevant author's terms, "Kantian") grounding of this
obligation, see Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417, 1448-63 (2004).
895
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 35, 2018
might cause is a "mere-utility loss" (is not life-of-moral-integrity-imperiling), to
do the research into the identity of the avoidance-moves that are available and
their prospective costs and benefits that one would find profitable to execute if
one treated one's prospective victims' equivalent-dollar losses as if they were
one's own and to make all relevant avoidance-moves whose appropriately-
perceived equivalent-dollar costs are lower than their appropriately-perceived
equivalent-dollar benefits and (B) when the loss that the actor might cause is life-
of-moral-integrity-imperiling, to do all avoidance-move-related research whose
execution is life-of-moral-integrity-promoting on balance and to make all
avoidance moves whose execution is life-of-moral-integrity-promoting on
balance,29 (9) put crudely,30 to provide rescue-services to potential rescuees
whom one has not endangered and with whom one does not have a chosen
intimate relationship or a status relationship that is usually associated with
intimacy' when the potential rescuee faces a significant risk of substantial
bodily harm or death and the potential rescuer is uniquely-well-placed to provide
the rescue-service and can do so without incurring a significant risk of sustaining
substantial bodily harm or death or devoting an inordinate amount of time to
executing the rescue,32 (10) not to confine others physically when there is no
moral justification for doing so, (11) not to abuse others psychologically, (12)
not to significantly reduce the ability of others to take their lives morally
seriously by undermining their self-confidence, (13) not to prevent others from
obtaining relevant intellectual skills, scientific/social/psychological information,
and information about different moral positions, and (14) not to violate the
29. For the liberal grounding of these conclusions, see Richard S. Markovits, On the
Content of the Corrective-Justice-Securing Tort Law of a Liberal, Rights-Based State, 2006 ILL. L. REV.
243, 258-68, 271-76 (2006).
30. For a more-completely-specified account of the duties to rescue of the members of
and participants in a liberal, moral-rights-based society, see id. at 276-280.
31. Liberalism implies that individuals have more extensive positive duties to help
chosen intimates and family-members than to help "strangers" because liberalism values intimate
relationships (including those that family-membership fosters) on the ground that they contribute to their
participants' taking their lives morally seriously. Such relationships do so by disposing their participants
to think about their moral identities and to analyze their moral duties to their relationship-partners and by
creating situations in which they can act on their conclusions. The positive value that liberalism places on
intimate relationships accounts for the fact that the basic moral duty of the members of and participants
in a liberal, moral-rights-based society is, inter alia, a moral duty to manifest appropriate concern for
each other as opposed to a moral duty to manifest appropriate, equal concern for each other: liberalism
countenances favoritism for chosen intimates and family-members in some contexts (though it recognizes
that this position should not be interpreted to allow choices that are motivated by prejudices against
members of other groups) because it values the contribution that chosen intimate and family relationships
can make to their participants' leading lives of moral integrity.
32. My conclusion that liberalism does not imply that individuals have more extensive
duties to provide rescue-services reflects the combination of my claim that liberalism places a lexically-
highest value on individuals' having and seizing the opportunity to take their lives morally seriously and
my admittedly contestable assumption that the imposition of positive duties on individuals reduces the
likelihood that they will take their lives morally seriously by militating against a self-perception of




privacy rights of others or to prevent others in other ways from participating in
relevant intimate relationship or having other sorts of experiences that would
contribute significantly to their taking their lives morally seriously.
Finally, I believe that the governments of liberal, moral-rights-based States
have a general duty to treat all moral-rights bearers for whom they are
responsible with appropriate, equal respect and to make choices that are
consistent with their having appropriate, equal concern for them as well (in part
for their hedonic welfare but pre-eminently for their having meaningful
opportunities to take their lives morally seriously). I also believe that this basic
moral duty entails a moral duty to make all choices that will maximize the extent
to which the moral-rights-related interests of the moral-rights bearers for whom
they are morally responsible are secured. More concretely, I believe that this
abstract duty entails inter alia moral duties (1) not to violate the negative moral
rights of such individuals in any of the ways in which non-government actors
can do so, (2) to provide moral-rights bearers whose negative moral rights have
been violated with appropriate opportunities for redress, (3) to ensure that each
moral-rights bearer has an appropriate, meaningful opportunity to take its life
morally seriously to secure for all such creatures the nutrition, clothing,
housing, medical care, physical protection, protection against emotional abuse,
protection against choice-capacity-diminishing psychological domination,
emotional support, formal education that teaches the intellectual skills and
inculcates the various kinds of knowledge that can contribute to individuals'
making informed moral choices, opportunities to learn about and experience
different moral positions/religious positions/life-styles, privacy, and
opportunities to enter into and maintain intimate relationships that contribute to
their taking their lives morally seriously, (4) to provide all (competent) citizens
with a (hard-to-define) appropriate, equal opportunity to influence the content
and implementation of the laws that will govern them, (5) to develop government
decision-making institutions and decision-protocols that reduce appropriately
the probability that legislative, administrative, and adjudicative decisions will be
made mistakenly or inappropriately parochially, and perhaps (6) to ensure that
government choices that are not fully determined by the government's liberal
moral obligations are appropriately congruent with the personal moral-good
convictions of the society's citizens or voters.
(2) "Liberty"
Some regulations of the categories of businesses traditionally perceived to
require regulation have been criticized for violating the "liberty interests" of the
businesspersons whom they constrain. This subpart discusses the way in which
"liberty" should be defined in liberal, moral-rights-based societies and the
implications of that definition for the moral soundness of the liberty-oriented
critiques of the regulations in question. Many conservative economists assert that
any reduction in the set of choices available to an individual (in his or her
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"opportunity set") and perhaps any decision or natural event that makes a choice
more costly to an individual reduces that individual's "liberty." 33 However, if the
concept of liberty is to play the role that it actually plays in the moral discourse
of liberal, moral-rights-based societies-viz., if the conclusion that a decision
restricts a moral-rights bearer's "liberty" implies that the decision disserves that
individual's moral-rights-related interests and can be just only if it promotes
other at-least-equally-weighty rights-related interests, the above liberty-
definition and the liberty-conclusions to which it leads are incorrect. In a liberal,
moral-rights-based society of perfect moral integrity (indeed, I suspect, in any
type of society of perfect moral integrity), with one possible exception,
individuals do not have a liberty-based moral right to commit any act that is
moral-rights-violative: the possible exception is that the members of and
participants in a liberal, moral-rights-based society may have a moral right to
refuse to interact intimately with others against whom they are prejudiced. More
positively, (1) the members of and participants in a liberal, moral-rights based
society have a "liberty interest" properly so-called in doing something only to
the extent that their doing it (A) contributes to their leading a life of moral
integrity by contributing to their ability to take their moral obligations seriously,
by enabling them to fulfill their moral obligations, by helping them to develop a
personal conception of the moral good, and/or by helping them to conform their
lives to their morally-defensible personal conception of the moral good or (B)
increases their utility or some other component of their non-life-of-moral-
integrity-related welfare and (2) a law that constrains one or more members of
or participants in a liberal, moral-rights-based society violates the constrainee's
liberty-based moral right properly-so-called only if (A) the law reduces both that
individual's opportunity to take his or her life morally seriously and the extent
to which (collectively) all members of and participants in the relevant society
have this opportunity or (B) the law reduces the extent to which the various other
liberal interests of the members of and participants in such a society are secured
(including their interest in having equal, appropriate concern be shown for their
utility).
In the United States, many regulations of business conduct have been
criticized on the ground that they violate the liberty rights of businesspersons.
That critique would be justified if the conservative-economist definition of
liberty accurately described the concept of liberty our society is committed to
instantiating. However, for four reasons, with the one limited, contestable
refusal-to-deal-related exception previously articulated, the various types of
business regulations that some have argued violate the liberty rights of the
businesses they constrain (regulations of the height of the prices that can be
charged for a product, regulations of the attributes that products must possess,
prohibitions of price discrimination, and regulations that require businesses to
supply all buyers who are willing to pay their standard price for their products)
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do not violate the liberty rights of the regulated businesspersons and/or their
shareholders if those rights are defined in the way they should be defined in a
liberal, moral-rights-based society: (1) the freedom of businesspersons to
determine the heights of their prices, to choose the attributes of the products they
supply, to price discriminate, and (with the limited, contestable qualification
articulated above) to choose the customers they will supply does not contribute
to their ability to take their lives morally seriously; (2) the business regulations
in question do not disserve any non-"mere-utility" interests of the constrained
businesspersons and shareholders whose moral salience liberalism recognizes;
(3) although business managers may find it intrinsically satisfying to run their
businesses in the knowledgeable and skilled way that maximizes the profits those
businesses generate, the constraints the above regulations impose on them do not
reduce their opportunities to make use of their business knowledge and skills
(think of the adjustments business managers can make to reduce the loss that
traditional fair-rate-of-return public-utility-pricing regulation will impose on
their businesses [the AJW effects of such pricing regulation]); and (4) although
the business regulations in question may reduce the profits of the regulated
businesses and hence the utility (salaries, dividends, capital gains) of their
managers and owners, there is no reason to believe that such business regulations
are more likely than law in general to manifest their promulgators' failure to have
equal, appropriate concern for their losers. (Admittedly, laws requiring
businesses to supply all buyers willing to pay the business' standard price for its
product may violate the businessperson's liberty right if [1] the good in question
is a service whose supply involves intimate interactions [e.g., is massage services
or psychological counseling], [2] the relevant businessperson must supply that
service personally, and [3] the relevant businessperson is prejudiced against one
or more of the buyers that would be willing to pay the business' standard price
for its service.)
(3) "Discrimination"
The term "discrimination" and its various cognates are used in two senses.
In the first, morally-pejorative sense, a choice is said to be "discriminatory" if it
is based on a morally-impermissible decision-criterion (say, that manifests a
prejudice against Blacks, East Asians, the Irish, women, Muslims, Jews, etc.). In
the second, morally-neutral sense, a choice is said to be "discriminating" if it
manifests the chooser's possession of relevant information/capacities whose
consideration/exercise is not morally opprobrious. Thus, a wine connoisseur may
have a "discriminating" palate, which enables him to distinguish the good stuff
from the plonk.
In the business-regulation context, the word "discrimination" is used to
cover two types of business-conduct: "price discrimination" and choices to serve
some but not all willing buyers. The issue is: are these types of business
"discrimination" morally opprobrious or neutral? The answer depends on why
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the business is treating certain individuals or groups differently. If the business
is charging some buyers higher prices because those buyers place a higher dollar-
value on the business' product than others do and it is profitable inter alia on
that account for such decisions to be made, the price discrimination is not moral-
rights-violative. It does not manifest the business' basing its choices on a
criterion whose use is morally opprobrious (does not manifest any disrespect for
either set of buyers). I hasten to add that, as I indicated earlier, price
discrimination may be moral-ought undesirable even if it is not moral-rights-
violative because the practice is economically inefficient 34 and does not
redistribute income sufficiently desirably from any defensible, relevant
distributive-norm perspective to promote any defensible, relevant conception of
the moral good.
If the business charges different buyers different prices because the
businessperson is prejudiced against some buyers and finds it more personally
costly to deal with them, the price discrimination is moral-rights-violative unless
the interaction between buyer and seller is sufficiently intimate to justify the
conclusion that the seller has a moral right to act on the basis of his prejudice in
the relevant context and one concludes (dubiously) that the associated right to
discriminate entails not only the right not to supply the target of one's prejudice
but the right to receive extra compensation for supplying a target of one's
prejudice. If the business is charging some buyers higher prices because some of
its other potential customers are prejudiced against those buyers and will
withhold their patronage from the business if it supplies the targets of their
prejudice or because some of its actual or potential employees are prejudiced
against those buyers and will not work for the business or will demand higher
wages if the business supplies the target of their prejudice, the moral status of
the business' engaging in the relevant price discrimination will be at least
contestable. Is it prejudiced or moral-rights-violative to do what is rendered
profitable by the prejudice of others? Precisely the same analysis will apply
mutatis mutandis when the relevant business-decision is a decision to supply
some buyers but not others. The cited behavior of the prejudiced potential
customers and employees of the business will be moral-rights-violative unless
their interaction with the targets of the prejudice would be sufficiently intimate
for the relevant customers/employees to have a moral right to indulge their
prejudices in the relevant context. I assure you that I feel uncomfortable with the
conditional in this last claim.
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(B) Other Moral Claims
I should now be able to address various other moral-rights and moral-good
claims that have been made about different kinds of conduct in which businesses
traditionally perceived to require regulation and their government regulators may
engage.
(1) The Claim That a Relevant Business Is Charging Immorally-High
Prices
Public utilities, pursuers of common callings, and common carriers are
sometimes criticized for charging immorally-high prices. More specifically, such
prices are sometimes condemned as "unjust," "exploitative," economic-
opportunity-denying, unacceptably-welfare-disserving, inegalitarian, and
undemocratic.
I do not think that the decision of any type of business to charge a high price
for its product is moral-rights-violative. Although I know some will disagree, I
believe that, in liberal, moral-rights-based societies, businesses are morally and
legally obligated to price their products to maximize the interests of their
shareholders/owners unless the law prohibits their doing so. The prices that are
charged may be high relative to marginal or average total cost, may be
"exploitative" in the sense that they yield the seller a high percentage of the
transaction surplus its transactions generate, may deny some potential or actual
buyers significant economic opportunities, may reduce utility or "welfare," and
may increase economic inequality. A business' decisions to charge certain prices
are certainly not democratic in that they are controlled by shareholders35 rather
than by the citizenry. However, even if the relevant pricing produces such
undesirable results-indeed, even if it critically reduces the opportunity of some
potential buyers to lead lives of moral integrity and even if such pricing is
"undemocratic," those realities do not make the business' pricing moral-rights-
violative. In liberal, moral-rights-based societies, businesses have no moral
obligation to benefit their customers and, I believe, morally ought not sacrifice
their shareholders' interest to do so. Admittedly, the high prices that businesses
charge may morally obligate the governments of any liberal, moral-rights-based
society in which they operate to take additional steps to secure some affected
buyers an appropriate opportunity to lead a life of moral integrity and may make
it moral-ought desirable for their governments to pass laws requiring the relevant
businesses to charge lower prices than they would otherwise find profitable to
charge.
(2) The Claim That a Relevant Business' Practice of Price Discrimination
35. Or by company-managers constrained by shareholders, boards of trustees, and the
takeover market.
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Is Moral-Rights-Violative
Businesses affected with a public interest have also been morally criticized
for price discrimination. Price discrimination has been assumed to reflect
prejudices, has been characterized as ipso facto unfair regardless of whether it
manifests prejudices, has been said to be "subordinating," has been said to
critically reduce the conventional welfare and significant opportunities of those
buyers who are charged the higher prices when the good is "essential," and has
been asserted to be generally undesirable.36
I suspect that very little price discrimination manifests prejudice, though I
acknowledge that it might be moral-rights-violative when it manifests the
discriminator's, customers', or employees' prejudices. I also recognize that the
governments of a liberal, moral-rights-based society are morally obligated to
combat such prejudices and to give the victims of prejudiced acts by such
perpetrators who have no moral right to indulge their prejudices in the relevant
context by practicing price discrimination appropriate opportunities to secure
redress. I also believe that price discrimination that does not manifest prejudice
is not unfair. Why should buyers who place a higher dollar-value on a good be
able to obtain more buyer surplus by purchasing it than do buyers who place a
lower dollar-value on that good? Why is it unfair for a seller to take advantage
of the fact that a potential customer places a high dollar-value on its product-
i.e., why should the gain associated with that reality be secured by the buyer
rather than by the seller? Moreover, in what morally-significant sense is price
discrimination "subordinating"?
Finally, I believe that one cannot justify the conclusions that a seller's price
discrimination is/would be moral-rights-violative or the conclusion that it
is/would be moral-ought desirable for the managers of a business to sacrifice its
shareholders' interests by foregoing price discrimination by proving that (1) the
good on which price discrimination is/might be practiced is "essential" either in
the sense that its consumption plays a critical role in the buyer's having a
meaningful opportunity to lead a life of moral integrity or in the sense that its
availability on non-discriminatory terms would for some reason increase
economic efficiency significantly by stimulating downstream activity or,
contrary to what I suspect will usually be true, (2) the relevant price
discrimination did/would not only disfavor poor buyers but deny poor people
who need the good effective access to it and/or did/would decrease economic
efficiency by reducing the "access" that some prospective downstream users of
the good have to it as a class. Once more, however, if price discrimination
did/would generate such effects, its practice may morally obligate the relevant
society's governments to do more to give relevant moral-rights holders a
meaningful opportunity to lead a life of moral integrity or render it morally good
for them to do something to promote downstream use of the seller's product by




buyers who were/would be charged discriminatively-high prices. In fact, as I
have already indicated, I suspect that it will often be morally good for
governments to prohibit price discrimination even when the practice does not
have any of the above effects.
(3) The Claim That Refusals to Deal Are Moral-Rights-Violative
Businesses whose regulation has traditionally been deemed desirable have
also been morally criticized for refusing to deal with particular potential buyers
or categories of potential buyers. The criticisms of such refusals to deal range
from assertions that the refusals manifest the refuser's prejudices to the claim
that the refusals are moral-rights-violative when they violate the refused party's
alleged moral right to have particular economic opportunities, to enjoy at least a
minimum level of welfare, or to secure goods that are "essential" for some
unstated reason.37 If the refusal to deal manifests the business-owner's prejudice,
it is moral-rights-violative (perhaps) unless the good was a service (say,
psychological counseling or perhaps physical therapy) whose supply involved
the kind of intimacy that entitled the business-owner to indulge his or her
prejudices.
By contrast, if the business' refusal to deal is profit-driven (is rendered
profitable by the prejudices of its actual/potential customers and/or employees),
the moral status of its disfavoring the targets of their prejudice may be
contestable. I hasten to add that the decisions of prejudiced potential customers
or employees that would make it profitable for the business to refuse to deal with
the target(s) of their prejudice would be moral-rights-violative unless patronizing
the business or working for the business created a sufficient probability that the
prejudiced potential buyers or potential employees would have to interact
sufficiently intimately with the targets of their prejudice to give them the right to
indulge their prejudice (as they would have the moral right not to marry someone
or not to date someone or not to invite someone to dinner if they were prejudiced
against the individual in question).
In any event, the governments of a liberal, moral-rights-based society
would be morally obligated not only to combat such prejudices but also to give
victims of such prejudices an appropriate opportunity to secure redress. I do not
think that, absent prejudice, refused parties have a moral right that non-
government actors provide them with the economic opportunities the refusals
deny them. Moreover, although I agree that the governments of liberal, moral-
rights-based societies are morally obligated to secure for refused parties the at-
least-minimum amount of welfare and the other specific goods, services, and
opportunities that contribute significantly to their having a meaningful
opportunity to lead lives of moral integrity, I do not think that non-government
37. See, e.g., Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1453
(2015).
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actors' refusals to deal that would deny the refused parties the meaningful
opportunity to lead a life of moral integrity if their governments did not prevent
that outcome are moral-rights-violative on that account.
(4) The Claim That Relevant Businesses' Supplying "Unacceptably-Low-
Quality" Goods Is Morally Wrong
Businesses whose regulation has traditionally been deemed appropriate
have also been morally criticized for supplying goods of unacceptably-low
quality. I should state at the outset that, unless these businesses are subjected to
price-regulations that preclude them from raising their prices to recover the
higher cost of supplying higher-quality products, the regulation of such
businesses will not render it profitable for them to supply lower-quality goods
when the relevant buyers would be willing to pay an amount for any increase in
quality that covers the private cost of its supply. Nor do I see any reason to
believe that buyers of the goods and services that are supplied by public utilities,
businesses affected with a public interest, pursuers of common callings, or
common carriers are unusually likely to misperceive the quality of the goods or
services with which they are being supplied or to undervalue quality-increases.
Of course, if businesses in the above categories actively misrepresent or
otherwise fail to reveal the negative attributes of the quality of the goods and
services they are supplying when it would be morally incumbent on them to
reveal such information, that conduct would be moral-rights-violative. A liberal,
moral-rights-based society's governments would have moral obligations to deter
such behavior and give its victims appropriate opportunities to obtain redress. I
suspect, however, that much of the concern that moral critics of such businesses
have about the quality of the goods and services manifests the critics' belief that
the companies should supply increases in quality whose cost the buyers in
question would not be willing to bear. I do not think that any moral-rights or
moral-ought argument for this generic claim can bear scrutiny.
V. Proposals for Improving Government Regulation
Both I and the other contributors to this Issue have recognized that the
government can use different policy-instruments to respond to the problems
caused by public goods, public utilities, businesses affected with a public interest
more generally, businesses that pursue common callings, and common carriers.3 8
38. See William Boyd, Just Price, Public Utility, and the Long History of Economic
Regulation in America, 35 YALE J. ON REG. 721 (2018); James Ming Chen, Speculative Undertakings:
Rate Regulation as a Branch of Corporate Finance, 35 YALE J. ON REG. 779 (2018); Prasad
Krishnamurthy, George Stigler on His Head: The Consequences ofRestrictions on Competition in (Bank)
Regulation, 35 YALE J. ON REG. 823 (2018); K. Sabeel Rahman, Infrastructural Regulation and the New
Utilities, 35 YALE. J. ON REG. 911 (2018); Daniel Schwarcz, Ending Public Utility Style Rate Regulation
in Insurance, 35 YALE J. ON REG. 941 (2018); Christopher S. Yoo, Common Carriage's Domain, 35 YALE




As economists in general and politically-conservative economists in particular
recognize, regardless of the type of policy instrument that governments use to
achieve any goal, government interventions in the economy are almost always
less-economically-efficient and less-morally-desirable than they could be.
Government regulatory-interventions are sub-optimal for a large number of
reasons. The available economic theory, natural-and-social-science theory, and
empirical information are imperfect. The government's decisionmakers are not
as skilled, well-informed, or able as would be economically efficient or morally
desirable. Government decisionmakers do not have appropriate incentives to
pursue the public interest. The decision-making processes that government
business-regulators use are not ideal. The relevant countries' more general
political processes have undesirable effects not only on the substance of the laws
that regulators implement but also on the ways in which the regulators interpret,
concretize, and apply those laws. This Part makes a few suggestions about how
government economic-regulatory decisions might be improved. I fully recognize
that its discussions are both partial and sketchy, that some proposals have already
been implemented in certain countries, and that the merits of some
recommendations are contestable.
My first set of proposals is directed at reducing the imperfections in the
theoretical and empirical information that is available to government business-
regulators. In my judgment, it would be both economically efficient and morally
desirable for government to do or subsidize theoretical micro-economics,
welfare-economics, natural-science, social-science and epidemiological research
on the policy-relevant effects of various types of business conduct and of various
business regulations. Such research could include studies of the amounts of
various pollutants that different business-activities generate, of the cost of
reducing such pollution, of the ways in which different pollutants interact to
cause economic losses, of the dollar value of the losses that different
combinations of pollutants generate, of the morally-relevant characteristics of
the winners and losers of various possible anti-pollution policies, of the
incidences and magnitudes of the relevant economy's imperfections in seller and
buyer competition, taxes on the margin of income, human errors, and buyer
surplus, of the various categories of economic inefficiency that can be generated
in an economy, of the different ways in which relevant types of Pareto
imperfections interact to cause each such category of economic inefficiency, and
of the protocol that would be economically efficient to use to predict or post-dict
the economic efficiency of any choice.3 9 I also think that it would be desirable
39. For an outline of the protocol for economic-efficiency analysis I now think would be
economically efficient, see Richard S. Markovits, The General Theory of Second Best and Economic-
Efficiency Analysis: The Theory, Its Negative Corollaries, the Appropriate Response to It, and a Coda on
the Economic Efficiency ofReducing Poverty and/or Income/Wealth Inequality, 49 AKRON L. REV. 437
(2016). For a fuller, more detailed account, see MARKOVITS, supra note 13, at 73-237. For the most
developed presentation of my position, see RICHARD S. MARKOVITS, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND
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for the government to require polluters to measure and report the amounts of the
various pollutants they generate and that it may be desirable for the government
to require at least large businesses to report the prices they charge for and the
marginal costs they must incur to produce their various products. Certainly,
legislation and judicial decisions that provide polluters with a positive incentive
to remain ignorant of the pollution they generate or that grant polluters the legal
right to keep private the information they have on such matters (on the ground
that the relevant businesses have a proprietary right to such information or
sometimes on the ground that such information should not be made public for
national-security reasons) should be reversed.40
My second set of recommendations focuses on the attributes of the
personnel of government business-regulation institutions. To start, such
institutions should have fewer political appointees: there may be good reason to
have a politically-appointed cabinet-minister/agency-commissioner and (say)
one deputy cabinet-minister/agency-commissioner in each
agency/commission/department. But the U.S. practice of filling the top five or
six levels of regulatory-institution positions with political appointees is unsound.
Next, such institutions' civil servants should be better-paid. Moreover, the
relevant civil servants should be selected not only on the basis of their
demonstrated intellectual ability but also on the basis of their possession of
relevant theoretical and empirical skills and knowledge. Alternatively, civil
servants who occupy business-regulation-decision-making positions should be
given substantial post-hiring training in relevant micro-economics, welfare
economics, natural science, social science, moral theory, research design, data
collection, and statistics/econometrics.
My third set of recommendations relates to the incentives of the civil
servants who engage in business regulation. Government regulators should be
provided with appropriate incentives to pursue a defensible conception of the
public interest not only by remunerating them well but also by making their
promotions depend on the quality of their job-performance. Better incentives
could also be provided by prohibiting regulators both from accepting
emoluments while performing their civil-service jobs and from becoming
employees of, consulting for, or giving profitably-remunerated lectures paid for
by the businesses they regulated after they leave their government positions.
Indeed, given the difficulty of preventing businesses from benefitting each
other's regulators and from subsidizing speeches or making charitable
contributions to academic institutions or charities, it may well be desirable to
place a more-encompassing set of restrictions on civil servants' post-
government-service remunerative activities.
SECOND-BEST THEORY: A THIRD-BEST-ECONOMICALLY-EFFICIENT DISTORTION-ANALYSIS PROTOCOL
FOR ECONOMIC-EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS (forthcoming 2019).
40. For a fuller discussion of U.S. laws and judicial rulings of these kinds, see Wendy E.
Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental Law to Produce Needed Information on




My fourth set of recommendations focuses on the government-business-
regulation decision-protocol. I will limit myself here to three proposals. First,
although actors (including public-interest groups) with substantial interests in a
regulatory decision should be provided with notices of proposed regulations and
given an opportunity to comment on them, strict limitations should be placed on
comment-submission time and comment length. Further, regulators should be
empowered to penalize parties who intentionally or perhaps (possibly)
negligently make inaccurate, misleading, or even irrelevant comments.
Regulators also should not be required to respond to all components of all
comments they receive. These last proposals militate against well-financed
regulatees' having undue power over regulatory decisions. Second, regulators
should be legally obligated to provide written justifications for their decisions,
indicating the moral-rights-related interests they were designed to secure and/or
the conception of the moral good they were designed to instantiate as well as the
non-moral theoretical and empirical conclusions on which they were based.
Third, laws should be passed obligating courts to adjust the degree of
deference they show to regulators when assessing, on the agency record, whether
to uphold the agency interpretation and application of laws to the reviewing
court's assessment of the care the regulators took and the skill they manifested
when making the regulatory decision.4 ' I admit that I would be more optimistic
about the effects of this third proposal if law students were better-trained (as they
should be) in economic analysis, moral analysis, scientific method, research
design, fact-gathering, and statistics and econometrics.
My fifth and final set of recommendations relates to the more general
political environment in which business-regulation decisions are made. I have
already addressed the problems posed by the disproportionate power of special
interests by proposing that political appointees play a smaller role, that civil
servants be better-paid and better-trained, that civil servants be precluded from
accepting compensation from regulatees during and after their period of
government service, that comments provided during the rulemaking process be
limited, that regulators be authorized to penalize improper participation in the
decisional process, and that business-regulators be required to provide detailed
written justifications for the decisions they have made. I recognize that the
following additional proposals are tremendously underspecified and contestable,
both politically and legally. I believe that businesses, industry peak-associations,
labor unions, and public-interest groups should not be allowed to contribute to
political parties or political campaigns and that strong constraints should be
placed on the ability of such groups to provide information or to make arguments
to legislators and members of the executive branch outside of public purview. I
also favor laws that strongly constrain the size of the financial contributions that
individuals can make to political parties and particular political campaigns, laws
making prisoners and convicted felons eligible to vote, laws making it easier for
41. Such a regime already exists in the United States.
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eligible voters to register to vote, laws facilitating the voting of eligible voters
by permitting absentee balloting and providing more and better polling-places,
and laws creating and enforcing a legal obligation on all eligible voters to vote
or cast a none-of-the-above ballot in local, state, and federal elections. In my
judgment, all these admittedly-underspecified recommendations would improve
the quality of government regulations of business not only by improving the
quality of the laws that executive-branch authorities are given to implement but
also the quality of their administration (given the fact that the relevant
departments' and commissions' budgets are controlled by the relevant country's
President/Prime-Minister/Chancellor and legislative bodies).
I recognize that a full discussion of political-process reform would have to
address the relative economic efficiency and moral desirability of (1)
parliamentary versus congressional systems, (2) centralized versus decentralized
governmental regimes, (3) proportional representation versus elections by
plurality vote in individual electoral districts versus something like the German
system that secures proportional representation of political parties (whose vote
constitutes at least some minimum percentage of the total votes cast) while
preserving some single-constituency representation based on plurality votes, (4)
bicameral versus unicameral legislative structure, (5) longer versus shorter terms
of legislative office, (6) legislative regimes in which key posts are assigned
randomly versus legislative regimes in which key posts are assigned through
seniority, (7) legislative regimes in which omnibus bills are permitted versus
legislative regimes in which each bill must address a related set of issues, (8)
legislative regimes in which any legislation supported by a majority of the
legislators or some lower percentage of the legislators must be brought to a vote
versus legislative regimes in which only those bills supported by a supermajority
of the legislature or a majority of the majority party (or coalition or the leader of
the majority party or coalition) can be brought to a vote, (9) legislative regimes
in which supermajorities are required for a bill to pass versus regimes in which
majority votes suffice, and (10) governmental systems in which moral rights are
protected by a constitution and the constitutionality of governmental acts is
determined by an independent judiciary versus governmental regimes in which
legislators and executive-branch officials are not subjected to such constraints,
etc. However, consideration of these and other important political-process issues
is beyond the scope of this Essay.
Conclusion
This Essay begins by criticizing the conventional definitions of "public
goods," "public utilities," and "businesses affected with a public interest." It then
explains why public goods would pose an economic-efficiency problem in an
otherwise-Pareto-perfect (oPp) economy and analyzes how that problem and the
appropriate response to it are affected by the reality that relevant economies are




regulation" renders it profitable for regulatees to make a wide variety of
otherwise-unprofitable business-decisions (generates AJW effects), (2) how this
reality complicates the task of regulating public utilities in the public interest, (3)
why this reality may favor government operation of public utilities over
government regulation of privately-owned public utilities, and (4) how the fact
that the relevant economies are not oPp affects the economic efficiency of the
AJW effects such price-regulations generate and further complicates the
identification of the most-economically-efficient regulatory scheme for
privately-owned public utilities and decision-guides for publicly-owned public
utilities. The Essay proceeds to examine various concepts that play an important
role in prescriptive-moral analysis, to assess various moral criticisms directed
against public utilities, to explain why government regulations do not have to
surmount significant hurdles to be morally desirable, and to analyze the possible
moral desirability of various types of government-responses to such business-
decisions. The last part of the Essay makes various proposals designed to
improve the economic efficiency and overall moral desirability of government
regulation of businesses that have traditionally been deemed to require regulation
and of government interventions in the economy more generally.
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